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Executive Summary 
 
The student revolt of May 1968 led to chaos across France, temporarily shaking the 
economic and political establishment. The crisis was unanticipated, unpredictable and 
short-lived. The famous events coincided with the period in which examinations are 
undertaken. In the university context, exams became a central aspect of the bargaining 
process between students and the authorities with the former successfully bargaining 
for ‘light-touch’ exams ‘to avoid harming students who have spent a lot of time 
struggling for a better university’. The general chaos and student lobbying led to the 
abandonment of normal exam procedures throughout the higher education system. For 
example, the important examination taken for the baccalauréat (success at which 
guarantees entry to university) only involved oral tests. As a result, the pass rate for 
various qualifications increased enormously in that one year.  
 
We show that the lowering of thresholds had important consequences for students at 
an early (and highly selective) stage of the higher education system. The events 
enabled a significant proportion of students born between 1947 and 1950 (particularly 
in 1948 and 1949) to pursue more years of higher education than would otherwise 
have been possible. We compare outcomes for cohorts affected by the relaxation of 
the examinations with cohorts that were too young or too old at this time.  There is a 
wage premium of 2-3 per cent for the most affected cohorts and an increased 
probability of achieving a high-status occupational position. We also show that 
persons from a middle-class family background were more likely to be among the 
‘marginal students’, and hence those for whom the effects of easier examinations are 
particularly evident. Finally, we show that returns were transmitted to the next 
generation on account of the relationship between parental education and that of their 
children.  
 
One can use these ‘1968 events’ as a ‘natural experiment’ to identify the causal effect 
of higher education. We contribute to two important debates within the economics of 
education literature: What is the true causal impact of education on labour market 
outcomes such as the wage? Is there a causal relationship between the education of 
parents and that of their children? Unlike all other papers in this literature, the 
intervention considered here (i.e. the alteration of exams as a consequence of May 
1968) is ‘one-off’ and temporary – it has no consequences for cohorts coming after 
the 1968 events; the incentive structure of the education system is unchanged. 
Furthermore, the focus of our paper is on the returns to higher education. In contrast 
most other papers using a similar identification strategy focus on interventions which 
affect years of compulsory schooling. The treatment group considered here is on the 
margin of the higher education system. This study is an important historic example of 
where thresholds were lowered at critical stages of the higher education system, 
enabling those on the margin either to enter university or pursue further years of 
higher education. This is of strong contemporary relevance in many countries where 
there is a big debate about widening access to higher education.  
 
Our study shows evidence of high private returns to an additional year of education 
for the marginal university entrant. The wage returns to an additional year of 
education are about 14 per cent. This is close to the maximum reported in studies 
looking at the effects of increasing the compulsory school-leaving age. There is a very 
strong causal relationship between parental education and that of their children. 
Hence, interventions leading to additional years of education can have long-term 
consequences for the stock of human capital in the economy.  
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 2 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In May 1968 a conflict between students and the university authorities in Paris 
precipitated a series of events that would lead to mass student protests, the biggest 
national strike in the history of France and the dissolution of Parliament. By mid-
June, the revolution was over and normal life resumed. However there were important 
consequences for those taking examinations in that year. In the university context, 
exams became a central aspect of the bargaining process between students and the 
authorities, with the former successfully bargaining for ‘light-touch’ exams ‘to avoid 
harming students who have spent a lot of time struggling for a better university’.1 
There are numerous examples of delays and modifications to university examinations 
taking place in that one year. The important examination taken for the baccalauréat 
(success at which guarantees access to university), only involved oral tests in that 
year. As a result the pass rate for various qualifications increased enormously. We 
show that the lowering of thresholds at an early (and highly selective stage) of the 
higher education system enabled a significant proportion of students born between 
1947 and 1950 (particularly in 1948 and 1949) to pursue more years of higher 
education that would otherwise have been possible. This was followed by a 
significant increase in their subsequent wages and occupational attainment, which was 
particularly evident for persons coming from a middle-class family background. 
Finally, returns were transmitted to the next generation on account of the relationship 
between parental education and that of their children.  
These findings are of interest in their own right. The 1968 events are shown to 
have had a positive and enduring impact on the affected cohorts – and their children. 
Although much has been written about the 1968 events, the literature has not picked 
                                                 
1
 For example, see the debates reported in the French newspaper Le Monde, 17 May 1968 
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up on this fact. Furthermore the ‘1968 events’ are an important historical example of a 
situation where thresholds were lowered at critical stages of the higher education 
system, enabling those on the margin either to enter university or pursue further years 
of higher education. This is of strong contemporary relevance in many countries, 
where there is a big debate about widening access to higher education. The experience 
of 1968 suggests that enabling the ‘marginal’ person to enter and persist in higher 
education can result in high private returns in the labour market and, because this is 
also transmitted to the next generation, may have a long run effect on the stock of 
human capital in the economy. 
One can use these ‘1968 events’ as a ‘natural experiment’ to identify the 
causal effect of education, and hence contribute to important debates within the 
economics of education literature: What is the true causal impact of education on 
labour market outcomes such as the wage? Is there a causal relationship between the 
education of parents and that of their children? As is well known, it is normally very 
difficult to identify the causal effects of education on subsequent outcomes. Highly 
educated individuals are likely to have many other specific attributes that are 
unobserved or difficult to measure. It is unclear whether their good labour market 
outcomes and high achieving children should be interpreted as a consequence of their 
education or as an effect of these unobserved attributes. One approach to overcome 
this problem is to find an instrument for educational attainment which is uncorrelated 
with an individual’s other attributes.2 Many studies have used this Instrumental 
Variable approach to estimate the returns to education, especially following Angrist 
and Krueger’s (1991) landmark study, which used an individual’s quarter of birth as 
an instrument for schooling. In the present context, we are able to use birth cohort as 
                                                 
2
 See Card (2001) for a review of the methodological issues in this literature and many of the important 
studies. 
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an instrument for education.  We also make use of the fact that within the most 
affected cohorts (1948 and 1949), there was a disproportionate effect on the education 
of those coming from a middle-class family background. Hence, we use the 1968 
events as a quasi-experimental setting to analyse the effects of an exogenous shock to 
educational attainment on the subsequent outcomes of the affected generation and 
their children. 
This approach is similar to several other studies which use a ‘natural 
experiment’ affecting particular birth cohorts as an Instrumental Variable strategy to 
estimate the labour market returns to schooling (e.g. Harmon and Walker, 1995; 
Lemieux and Card, 1998) and to identify the relationship between parental education 
and that of their children (Black et al, 2003; Chevalier, 2004; and Oreopoulos et al., 
2003). Thus, the first part of the paper relates to the private return to education, 
whereas the second part is relevant to the debate on whether education of the current 
generation can affect the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Little is 
known about the second issue in particular, where there is far less empirical evidence. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study which estimates the returns to education of 
parents on their own outcomes and those of their children in the same framework.  
The focus of our paper is on the returns to higher education. In contrast, the 
above cited papers focus on interventions which affect years of compulsory 
schooling.3 The ‘treated group’ (and hence those for whom returns to education are 
identified) are generally those who leave the education system with relatively low-
level qualifications. However, the effect of an increase in years of education might be 
quite different depending on when the individual is exposed to it. The composition of 
the treatment group might also differ for a shock which affects higher education. The 
                                                 
3
 One exception is Lemieux and Card (1998) who focus on the effect of a program designed to 
facilitate the further education of post World War II veterans in Canada. 
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treatment group in our paper is composed of those on the margin of the higher 
education system. We show large private returns to an additional year of higher 
education for this group – higher than would be suggested by studies which rely on an 
intervention affecting the length of compulsory schooling. This suggests that the 
return to an additional year of higher education may have a larger effect on an 
individual’s earning capacity than an additional year of compulsory schooling. 
Furthermore, there is a strong causal relationship between an additional year of higher 
education and the educational performance of children. 
 This paper has the following structure: in Section 2, our descriptive section, 
we provide further details of the consequences of the 1968 events for the 
examinations undertaken in that year; and we use our data to provide descriptive 
evidence of the cohorts affected. In Section 3, we develop a simple model to show 
how different cohorts will be affected by the 1968 events and then we estimate the 
returns to education in the labour market using two identification strategies - the first 
using the fact that particular birth cohorts were affected by the 1968 events; and the 
second using the fact that the impact was strongly linked to the family background of 
the affected cohorts. In Section 4, we consider the consequences for the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital when we use the ‘natural experiment’ 
to estimate the relationship between parental education and that of their children. 
Finally, we draw together conclusions from the analyses. 
 
 
2. Descriptive Section 
 
 
2.1 The 1968 events and the examinations 
 
In 1967 and 1968, a wave of student protest movements broke out across Europe, 
Japan and the United States. This was the era of mass protest against politics and 
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social values, about which much has been written. However, pre-May 1968, there was 
no mass student movement in France (Touraine, 1971) and the events of that month 
took everyone by surprise. This is well encapsulated by the now famous editorial 
written in a French national newspaper in March of that year: ‘the French are bored. 
They are not taking part either directly or indirectly in the great convulsions which are 
shaking the world….’4  The spark that set off the dramatic sequence of events in 
France was the decision to close the University of Nanterre in Paris on 2 May 
(following months of protest between students and the authorities at that institution) 
and the heavy-handed response of the police to the subsequent protest at the 
Sorbonne. The protests quickly snowballed in university towns across the whole of 
France. Then workers became involved: ‘it was only in France that the revolt of the 
students got a response from the workers…that precipitated the biggest general strike 
in French history, paralyzing the economy…’ (Singer, 2000). Over 10 million French 
workers were involved in the strikes – roughly two-thirds of the French workforce. De 
Gaulle dissolved the national assembly and called for new parliamentary elections in 
June. These actions effectively ended the brief, dramatic ‘revolution’.  
 In the midst of these events, university examinations became a central aspect 
of the bargaining process between the administration and the students. The former 
exerted considerable pressure for exams to be ‘light’ in that year. There was extensive 
coverage in the French newspaper Le Monde of general controversy surrounding the 
examination procedures of that year and notice of the numerous delays and 
modifications to procedures in different institutions throughout the country. The 
following quotations are among those of student representatives: ‘exams do not have 
to be abolished: it would harm students who need their diploma’; ‘exams do not have 
                                                 
4
 Le Monde, 14 March 1968. 
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to be as hard as usual: it would damage the students who have spent a lot of time 
struggling for a better university’.5 The authorities seem to have given way to student 
demands for ‘light-touch’ exams in that year, so as not to deny the value of the 
student movement.  
 The examination for the baccalauréat in 1968 provides one very interesting 
and important example of the consequences of these decisions. The baccalauréat is 
‘the symbolic national diploma both crowning the successful completion of secondary 
education and providing a passport for entry into higher education’.6  It can be seen as 
the first examination within the French system of higher education. It has a long and 
distinguished history from its foundation by Napoleon in 1808. Normally it involves 
several oral and written examinations, which consists of open-ended questions, a 
commentary on documents etc…, and takes place over several days.  Students must 
obtain the baccalauréat to advance within the system of higher education. Indeed, this 
qualification gives recipients an automatic right to attend university. In May 1968, it 
was announced that the examination for the baccalauréat would be postponed7  but 
this was superseded by a later announcement, which stipulated that there would be 
two oral examinations on the same day.  Candidates were informed of their results on 
the day of taking the examination, thus implying that examiners from different places 
did not consult with one another before making a final decision over the grades 
(normally there is a national commission to harmonize marking procedures). As a 
result, the number of persons obtaining the baccalauréat in 1968 was about 30 per 
                                                 
5
 Students attending the ‘commission des examens’ at the Sorbonne, as reported in Le Monde, 17 May 
1968. 
6
 French Embassy in the UK,  
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/asp/service.asp?SERVID=100&LNG=en&PAGID=92 
7
 This decision was taken on 24 May, the day of the resignation of the Minister of Education, Alain 
Peyrrefites. 
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cent larger than in the adjacent years, whereas the size of the corresponding birth 
cohorts was fairly stable over this period (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Trends in the number of bacheliers and in cohort size. 
 
0.5
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Source:  French Ministry of Education (number of bacheliers) and the French Statistical Office 
(cohort size). The number of bacheliers reported for cohort t corresponds to the number of bacheliers 
recorded at date t+19 (19 is the median age of candidates).  The two series are normalised to 1 in 1945.  
 
The lax examination procedures of 1968 were also important at the most 
selective stages of the university system, typically for students in the first two years 
(premier cycle). These first two years make it possible to obtain a university diploma 
(generally, an upper-level technician diploma) and are essential in order to pursue a 
university degree (1 year) or a masters (2 years).  We have made a systematic 
investigation of newspaper archives and they are full of examples showing the 
difficulties faced by university administrators in organising exams to be held at that 
time. In almost every university, it was not possible to organise regular examinations 
without protracted delays and adaptations reflecting the bargaining process between 
the students and the administration. For example, the Brevets de Techniciens 
Supérieurs (upper-level technician diploma) was granted to students without any 
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specific examination in 1968. Instead the decision to confer this qualification was 
made on the basis of the candidate’s work throughout the two years.8   
 
2 .2 The 1968 events and educational credentials 
The potential consequence of easier examinations is an increase in the final 
educational outcomes of the beneficiaries. Each year, a certain proportion of students 
(generally those who have been held back a grade already) do not pass examinations 
in the early stages of higher education and drop out of the education system, whereas 
they would have stayed if the examinations had been easier. The effect of a significant 
relaxation of examinations on any given birth cohort is important if it contains a high 
proportion of such students at relevant stages of education in that year. Hence we can 
speculate that the 1968 events have primarily affected the students born between 1947 
and 1950, i.e. the cohorts who were at an early stage of higher education at this time. 
This can be illustrated using the French Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the 
years 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999.9 The LFS is a large representative sample of the 
French population of age 15 and above. The number of respondents per cohort is 
about 10,000 for our pooled sample. We focus on outcomes for male workers, leaving 
an analysis of the impact of the 1968 events on female outcomes for a separate paper. 
A detailed breakdown of the effect of 1968 is provided in Table 1, which 
shows the percentage of male wage earners in each birth cohort within the following 
categories of educational attainment: below the baccalauréat (bac); the baccalauréat, 
but no higher; any university qualification; a two-year university diploma ‘bac+2’; 
and at least a degree-level university qualification ‘>bac+2’. A number of interesting 
                                                 
8
 Le Monde, 25 June 1968. 
9
 These four years were selected as the sample is rotating every three years, and we are interested to 
observe the same person only at one point. We do not use surveys before 1990 as they do not contain 
information on wages. 
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facts emerge from this table. Firstly, the percentage of workers with at least the 
baccalauréat is similar in 1946 and 1952. Secondly, the majority of workers in the 
LFS with the baccalauréat subsequently achieve a higher qualification at university, 
but the percentage is significantly higher for students born between 1947 and 1950 
than for students born in adjacent years. Hence, there is a significant shift in the 
percentage of workers with at least a university diploma (bac+2), with a peak for the 
1949 cohort (i.e. those of age 19 at the time of the 1968 events). For those with a 
university degree or higher (>bac+2), the peak is for the 1948 cohort. Taken together, 
the most affected cohort is 1949, i.e. persons who were 19 years of age in 1968. 
 
Table 1 : The distribution of education across male workers, by year of birth  
  
<Bac 
  
Bac, but no 
higher 
  
>Bac 
 
     All Bac+2 
(diploma) 
>Bac+2 
(degree+) 
1946 72.7 
(0.7) 
 9.9 
(0.4) 
 17.4 
(0.6) 
6.3 
(0.3) 
11.0 
(0.5) 
1947 72.2 
(0.7) 
 9.0 
(0.4) 
 18.8 
(0.6) 
7.1 
(0.4) 
11.8 
(0.5) 
1948 71,9 
(0.7) 
 9.1 
(0.4) 
 19.0 
(0.6) 
6.9 
(0.4) 
12.1 
(0.5) 
1949 70.0 
(0.7) 
 9.8 
(0.4) 
 20.3 
(0.6) 
8.6 
(0.4) 
11.6 
(0.5) 
1950 71.8 
(0.7) 
 9.8 
(0.4) 
 18.4 
(0.6) 
8.0 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5) 
1951 72.3 
(0.7) 
 9.8 
(0.4) 
 17.9 
(0.6) 
7.5 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5) 
1952 72.4 
(0.7) 
 9.8 
(0.4) 
 17.8 
(0.6) 
7.3 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5) 
        
Source: Labor Force Survey, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999. Male wage earners. 
 
 
In theory, persons who are of ‘normal’ age pass the baccalauréat at the age of 
18. In practice, the majority repeats at least one grade when in primary or secondary 
school and passes the baccalauréat at the age of 19. This means that a significant 
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proportion of the 1949 cohort was actually studying for the baccalauréat in 1968.10 
Specifically, about 10 per cent of the 1949 cohort was in this position in that year.  
(see Appendix A). Given that the pass rate for the baccalauréat   increased by about 
30 per cent, it is clear that the events of 1968 enabled a significant fraction of these 
students to cross the threshold for the baccalauréat, allowing the pursuit of further 
years of education and the eventual attainment of a university diploma or above.11 
There is also a group of persons born in 1949 who were already at university 
in 1968. This smaller group, who had passed the baccalauréat at 18 years or younger, 
constitutes about 7 per cent of the cohort. Students who enter university without 
having to repeat a grade at school are more likely to pursue their studies in more 
prestigious institutions and the vast majority (over 90 per cent) are successful in 
obtaining a university qualification. The impact of the events on the final educational 
qualification obtained by this group can only have been marginal.  
Thus, among those born in 1949, the only group whose educational career was 
substantively affected by the events of May 1968 comprised students at the end of 
their secondary education who were taking examinations for the baccalauréat, having 
already repeated a grade at secondary school. As shown by Table 1, the events not 
only enabled an important fraction (about 2.5 per cent of the cohort) to pass 
examinations for the baccalauréat, but also to pursue further studies and subsequently 
obtain a university qualification. Had they been born one year earlier or one year later, 
they would have left school without the baccalauréat.  
                                                 
10
 The survey “Formation et la Qualification Professionnelle” (FQP, 1993) confirms that the median 
age of candidates for the baccalauréat is 19 and shows that students studying for the baccalauréat in 
1968 comprised about 36 per cent from the 1949 cohort; 26 per cent from 1950; 18 per cent from 1948; 
7 per cent from 1947 and 8 per cent from 1951. The FQP is a small representative survey of French 
adults, which contains detailed, retrospective questions about the educational career of participants.  
11
 A pass rate of about 30 per cent applied to 10 percent of the 1949 cohort suggests that about 3 per 
cent of the cohort would have been affected. This order of magnitude is consistent with that implied by 
column 1 of Table 1.  
 12 
Hence, in our econometric strategy we largely focus on outcomes for the 1949 
cohort as compared to ‘control’ cohorts of 1946 and 1952, who are unlikely to have 
been affected by the 1968 events. This allows us to identify the average effect of the 
years spent in higher education for the group of students who are just below the 
minimum level of scholastic ability required to pass the baccalauréat in a normal year 
and who would not have obtained it if the minimum level had remained constant in 
1968. 
 
2.3. Within cohort effects of 1968 
The cohorts born between 1947 and 1950 have been more affected by the 1968 events 
because they were more likely to take important examinations at this time and hence 
more likely to be at a highly selective stage of the education system, where the 
probability of failure is high. However, it is not the case that the members of these 
birth cohorts have been equally exposed to the events of 1968. Specifically, only 
marginal students have been affected – i.e. people who would not have been able to 
pass the examinations if they had been taken one year before (or after) the 1968 
events and who would not have been able to pass if they had repeated the exam year. 
It is possible to better identify these marginal students by exploring the distribution of 
educational credentials by social background. 
In the Sixties and early Seventies, most children from lower socio-economic 
groups left school before taking the exam for the baccalauréat, whereas children from 
higher socio-economic groups were likely to pass the baccalauréat and enter 
university.12 Middle-class children were more likely than the former group to persist 
in the secondary school system but less likely than the latter group to pass the exams 
                                                 
12
 Only 10% of the sons of manual workers passed the baccalauréat, compared to about two thirds of 
the sons of cadres (i.e. an upper-level white collar position). 
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for entry into tertiary education.13 For example, using the LFS, one can observe that 
the sons of middle-class fathers (employés or artisans-commerçants) were the most 
likely to pass the diploma taken at the end of junior school (BEPC) without 
subsequently passing the baccalauréat (see Appendix B). Hence, it follows that the 
‘marginal’ student is less likely to be from a lower socio-economic group (who leave 
school without taking the baccalauréat) or a higher socio-economic group (who have 
less difficulty in passing the exams). The ‘marginal’ student is more likely to be 
middle-class. Table 2 provides support for this hypothesis, since the effect of the 1968 
events is more pronounced for male workers from a middle class family background 
than for workers from other social groups. The difference in the log odds of holding a 
university diploma between workers from a middle-class family background and 
workers from any other type of family background increased by about .40 between 
1946 and 1949 and then decreased by about .28 between 1949 and 1952 (see the last 
column of Table 2). In other words, there is a notable peak in the log odds differential 
for the cohorts most affected by the 1968 events, which is consistent with these events 
having been particularly important for students from a middle-class family 
background. Thus, our second econometric strategy will focus on variations in the 
educational gap between the sons of middle class fathers and the sons of fathers from 
other socio-economic groups across birth cohorts, and test whether these variations 
have been accompanied by similar variations in their labour market outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 As in other countries, there is evidence that educational attainment is strongly linked to family 
background in France (see for example Goux and Givord, 2004).   
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Table 2 : Percentage of  male workers in each birth cohort with at least a 
university diploma, by social background.  
  
Social Background 
 
 
Birth 
cohorts 
Middle Class (*)  Other Social Classes Relative 
Odd ratios 
(**) 
 Upper-level 
middle 
Lower-level 
middle 
All 
 
 Low 
(manual 
worker, 
farmer) 
High 
(white 
collar) 
All 
 
 
 
1946 
 
21.8 
 
15.7 
 
18.2 
 
  
8.8 
 
47.2 
 
17.1 
 
1 
1947 25.9 20.9 22.9 
 
 9.1 49.8 17.4 1.30 
1948 25.6 22.5 23.8 
 
 10.1 44.1 17.4 1.37 
1949 29.1 23.1 25.7 
 
 10.2 49.2 18.5 1.40 
1950 27.4 17.9 21.7 
 
 9.6 45.4 17.4 1.21 
1951 26.4 19.1 22.1 
 
 8.6 47.3 16.6 1.31 
1952 22.9 20.2 21.3 
 
 9.3 44.9 16.6 1.12 
         
 *Upper-level middle class corresponds to Artisans and Commerçants (i.e. shopkeepers, craftmen, self-
employed…) whereas lower-level middle class corresponds to Employés (i.e., non-manual routine 
workers, clerks). 
**If qt denotes the probability of holding a university diploma for workers born in t and coming from a 
middle class family and pt denotes this probability for workers from other social classes, then the 
relative odds under consideration can be written  [qt(1- pt)/ pt(1-qt)]/ [q46(1- p46)/ p46(1-q46)]. The last 
column shows the changes in these relative odds across cohorts. 
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3. Labour Market Returns to Education 
 
 
3.1. Modelling framework 
 
Let yi, the earning capacity of worker i at the entry into the labour market, be written 
as follows: 
iii uny += α     (3.1) 
where ni denotes the number of grades that worker i has passed in higher education;14 
ui is the unobserved ability of the worker; and α  represents the return to years of 
higher education. Let Fu denote the cumulative distribution function of ui and assume 
it is constant across cohorts. If ni were uncorrelated with ui, the estimation of α would 
represent no difficulty – it would simply require comparing the wages earned by 
workers with different levels of education. However, a problem arises if high ability 
persons are more likely to pass exams which give access to higher education. In that 
case ni will be correlated with ui and the wage gap between persons with different 
years of higher education will also reflect their ability. The 1968 events provide us 
with an opportunity to overcome this problem on account of the exogenous shift in 
years of higher education, which enables an instrumental variable strategy. 
 To keep things as simple as possible, let us assume that the system of higher 
education consists of N basic grades and denote c1<c2<…<cN as the levels of ability 
that are required to pass entry exams into each grade. Without any grade repetition, 
each student i will reach the level ni, where 1+<= ii nin cuc  (and we set co= -∞ and 
cN+1=∞   as a normalisation).15 He/she can only obtain access to the next grade by 
repeating a year and will only gain access to this higher grade (ni+1) if  
                                                 
14
 Higher education is defined as any education above the first stage of secondary education. In France, 
the second stage of secondary education is at ‘le Lycée’ and consists of preparation for the 
baccalauréat. 
15
 For example, c1 represents the minimum level of ability required to pass the baccalauréat without 
grade repetition.  
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21 ++ <+= ii nin cruc , where r represents the impact of grade repetition on the capacity to 
pass an exam. For simplicity, we assume that 
1+<+ kk crc , so that repetition only 
makes it possible to persist in education for one additional grade.  
 In this simple setting, the number of grades is  a function of ui and can be 
written as follows:  
 
 )(1 1
0
+
=
<+=∑= ki
N
k
ki cruckn
    (3.2)   
 
where 1(x) is a dummy indicating whether x is true or not. Now assume that the 
thresholds are exogenously shifted downwards at the end of a specific year T (i.e. 
1968). Let us denote c′1<c′2<…<c′N as the new thresholds. Also assume   1+∋−= kk ccr , 
meaning that the effect of grade repetition is at least as large as the advantage 
provided to students by the downward shift in the thresholds. In this case, students 
who are of “normal” age in year T cannot be affected by the shift. In contrast, the 
educational career of students who have already been held back a grade may well be 
altered significantly.      
Specifically, consider students who have repeated a grade and are in the last 
year of secondary school (i.e. terminal). In our case, this corresponds to the 1949 
cohort. There are students in this cohort such that 
11 cruc i <+<∋  and hence would 
not have passed the examinations for the baccalauréat if the threshold had remained 
constant. They obtain the baccalauréat only on account of the 1968 events. The 
proportion of such students can be written as follows:  
)()( 11 rcFrcFP uu −∋−−=. .  
When we compare the 1949 cohort either with a cohort who were far beyond 
the stage of taking selective examinations in 1968 (such as 1946) or with a cohort 
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who had not yet arrived in terminal (such as 1951 or 1952), we find that a proportion 
∆P has attended one supplementary grade within the higher educational system. This 
generates an outcome ∆y=α∆P. 
In this very simple setting, a regression of y on n provides an unbiased 
estimator (∆y/∆P) of the returns to higher education (α) when a dummy variable to 
indicate whether the individual belongs to the 1949 cohort is used as an instrumental 
variable. This strategy identifies the impact of the treatment on the treated group, the 
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). 
 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
 
Following on from the simple model described above, we write the wages wi earned 
by worker i from cohort ci at age ai as follows:  
iiiii ucanw +++= δ.α      (3.3) 
Holding age constant, the cohort trend is equivalent to a time trend and captures the 
effect of a general increase in productivity on wages. Building on the previous 
subsection (eq. 3.2), we assume that years of higher education (ni) vary in a non-linear 
way across cohorts:  
iiiiiii veCdCdCdCdCdn ++++++= τ51515050494948484747   (3.4) 
where the Cit variables represent cohort dummies, τi a cohort trend and vi a random 
variable which captures the influence of unobserved ability on years of education. The 
d coefficients reflect the effect of the 1968 events on the minimum levels of ability 
that are required to pass the exams. This effect varies across the different cohorts 
depending on the stage they were at in the education system in 1968. The potential 
correlation between vi and unobserved factors affecting wages (as reflected in ui) is 
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the reason why estimation of equation (3.3) may be misleading without the benefit of 
the natural experiment, which is provided by the 1968 events.  
 In our empirical strategy, we first estimate the reduced form of the earnings 
equation by substituting equation (3.4) into (3.3). If our understanding of the 1968 
events is correct (and if α is positive), dummy variables for the 1948 and 1949 cohorts 
should have a strong positive effect in addition to the cohort trend. Secondly, we 
restrict our sample to the most affected cohort (1949) and two cohorts that appear to 
be unaffected (1946 and 1952) and we identify the return to education using Ci49 as an 
instrumental variable. 
 This approach assumes that Ci49 does not affect wages other than through an 
individual’s educational attainment. Hence, it implicitly assumes that employers have 
not been able to discriminate against individuals who have benefited from easier 
exams at a point in their educational career.16 This might be a reasonable assumption 
in the present context as most people affected by the 1968 events subsequently went 
on to achieve a higher level of education. If employers place more weight on the 
highest level of education attained than on earlier qualifications, then one would not 
expect to observe a penalty for these workers. Furthermore, employers would need to 
have good information about the educational consequences of 1968. However, to 
account for this possibility, we develop a second identification strategy which does 
not rely on cohort effects to identify the returns to education. 
 Given that the effects of the 1968 events are expected to vary by family 
background for the reasons discussed above, our second identification strategy 
                                                 
16
 There is also a possibility that an increase in the supply of educated workers in the 1949 cohort 
depressed skill prices and hence depressed the return to education for this cohort relative to other 
cohorts. In this case, estimates will capture the general equilibrium effect to the extent that depends on 
the elasticity of substitution across cohorts. If workers from different cohorts are highly substitutable 
(which might be expected, since we are observing workers at an advanced stage of their career), then 
estimates of the wage return to education will only capture this effect to a small extent (if at all). 
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involves using the interaction between birth in the affected cohort and coming from a 
middle-class family background. Hence, we augment equations (3.3) and (3.4) by 
including a cohort dummy for year of birth and a dummy for family background. In 
equation (3.3), we also include an interaction term between the dummy for ‘middle 
class’ and whether the worker was born in the affected cohort. This interaction term 
enables identification while also allowing for cohort effects to exert a direct influence 
on wages.  
 
3.3. Regression results 
The essence of our results can be simply illustrated. Figure 4 shows the impact of 
birth cohort on the probability of obtaining a university diploma and the probability of 
holding an upper-level white collar position (i.e.  cadre)17 in OLS regressions where 
we control for a cohort trend and an age trend (eq. 3.4). The birth cohorts are 
observed in LFS surveys between 1990 and 1999. Hence, the occupation of survey 
participants reflects their position when in their forties. The pattern in the data shows 
a marked similarity for the two different effects and provides good prima facie 
evidence of the relationship between educational and labour market outcomes, with a 
pronounced upward shift for persons born in 1949.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 About 15% of the population of male workers in our sample hold these positions. Their wages are on 
average twice as high as the wages of other workers. In the French context, being a “cadre” may be 
interpreted as a proxy for permanent income.  
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Figure 4: The net effects of cohort of birth on the probability of holding at least a 
university diploma and on the probability of holding an upper-level white-collar 
position (cadre) 
0
0,005
0,01
0,015
0,02
0,025
0,03
46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Cohorts
Cohort effect on
college dip.
Cohort effects on
occupational level
 
A more comprehensive summary of the impact of birth cohort on the 
education and labour market outcomes of workers is provided in Table 3. Columns (1) 
to (3) show the probability of obtaining various educational qualifications for each 
birth cohort (relative to a reference group born in 1946 or 1952), controlling for a 
cohort trend and the age of the worker. The educational qualifications are: 
baccalauréat only; at least a university diploma (bac+2 or more); at least a university 
degree (bac+3 or more). We have converted qualifications to the equivalent number 
of years in higher education18 and this is the dependent variable in column 4. Then in 
columns 5 and 6, we report these regressions where the dependent variables are labour 
market outcomes – log wages and the probability of holding an upper-level white 
collar position (i.e. ‘cadre’).  
 
                                                 
18
 We have constructed the variable “number of years in higher education” with a value of 3 for 
workers with bac only (the three years of upper-secondary education), 5=3+2 for workers with bac+2 
and 7=5+2 for workers with more than bac+2.  
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Table 3: The impact of birth cohort the education and labour market outcomes 
of male workers  
        
 Bac only At least 
university 
diploma   
(bac+2 or 
more) 
At least 
university 
degree 
(bac+3) 
Number years 
higher 
education* 
 Wages  Cadre 
(Upper White 
collar 
occupations) 
 
 
1947 -.009 
(.006) 
.014 
(.008) 
.008  
(.006) 
.06 
(.05) 
 .006  
(.010) 
.001  
(.008) 
1948 .007 
(.006) 
.015 
(.008) 
.012  
(.006) 
.08 
(.05) 
 .031 
 (.010) 
.008 
 (.008) 
1949 -.001 
(.006) 
.027 
(.008) 
.009  
(.006) 
.15 
(.05) 
 .021  
(.010) 
.016  
(.008) 
1950 -.001 
(.006) 
.008 
(.008) 
-.002  
(.006) 
.03 
(.05) 
 .005 
 (.010) 
.000  
(.008) 
1951 -.005 
(.006) 
.002 
(.008) 
-.001  
(.006) 
.01 
(.05) 
 .003  
(.010) 
.003  
(.008) 
Trend  -.000 
(.001) 
.001 
(.008) 
-.001 
 (.001) 
.005 
(.010) 
 .010  
(.002) 
-.005 
 (.001) 
Age -.000 
(.001) 
.001 
(.008) 
.0002 
(.0006) 
.004 
(.005) 
 .023  
(.001) 
.003  
(.001) 
N 26370 26370 26370 26370  26370 26370 
        
Source: LFS, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. 
Sample: Male wage earners born between 1946 and 1952 
 
 
 The results show a significant positive impact of being born in cohorts 
particularly affected by the 1968 events (1949 and 1948) in terms of the probability of 
obtaining a university qualification or higher years of education and in terms of labour 
market outcomes. There is a wage premium of 2-3 percent from having been born in 
1948 or 1949. There is also a higher probability of obtaining a high status 
occupational position (cadre) for those born in 1949.  
In Table 4, we show results from estimating the earnings equation and the 
probability of being in a high level occupation (cadre) using OLS (columns 1 and 3) 
and using birth in 1949 as an instrumental variable for years of higher education 
(columns 2 and 4). In this case, only cohorts born in 1949 and the two control years 
(1946 and 1952) are included in the analysis.19 The results indicate that each 
                                                 
19
 Results are similar when the sample is restricted to cohorts born in 1946, 1948 and 1952, where birth 
in 1948 is used as the instrumental variable. Estimates are larger, though less well determined. 
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additional year spent in higher education increases wages by about 14 percentage 
points and the probability of holding a high-status position by 10 percentage points.20   
In the earnings equation, the point estimate for years of higher education is higher in 
the IV regression than in the OLS regression, indicating a possible downward bias in 
the former case (although they are not statistically different). A higher estimate in the 
IV specification is a fairly typical finding in the literature estimating the returns to 
education (Card, 2001). For example, it may be due to errors in the measurement of 
education or reflect the fact that the return to education is higher for the ‘marginal’ 
student affected by 1968 than for the average student. When looking at the probability 
of holding a high status position (cadre), point estimates from the two approaches are 
very close.  
Table 4: An evaluation of the return to education using 1949 as an instrumental 
variable 
      
 Wages  Probability of upper white collar 
occupation (cadre) 
 OLS IV  OLS IV 
 
Years of higher 
education* 
 
.09 
(.002) 
 
.14 
(.06) 
 
  
.10 
(.001) 
 
.10 
(.04) 
Cohort trend .010 
(.002) 
.010 
(.02) 
 
 -.006 
(.001) 
-.006 
(.001) 
Age .023 
(.001) 
.023 
(.002) 
 .003 
(.001) 
.003 
(.001) 
 
N 11171 11171  11171 11171 
R-squared .25 .04  .36 .01 
      
Source: LFS, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. 
Sample: Male wage earners born in 1946, 1949 or 1952. 
 
 
As discussed above, there may be a concern that cohort dummies should enter 
directly into the wage equation, if the 1968 events had a direct effect on wages (as 
                                                 
20
 The results are qualitatively similar when we measure education by whether the worker holds at least 
a university diploma. 
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well as through years of higher education). Hence, we implement our second 
instrumental variable strategy, which uses the interaction between birth in 1949 and 
being from a middle-class family background to identify the return to an additional 
year of higher education, and thus enables the birth cohort dummy to enter directly 
into the wage equation. Regression results are shown in table 5. The first column 
shows the first stage regression, where years of higher education are regressed against 
age, birth cohort, social background and interactions between cohort and being from a 
middle-class family background. The interaction term between birth in 1949 and 
having a middle-class family background is shown to have a positive and significant 
effect. Columns (2) and (3) show reduced form regressions, where the dependent 
variables are, respectively, log wages and holding an upper-level white-collar 
occupation (cadre). Again, positive and significant effects are shown for having been 
born in 1949 and coming from a middle-class family background. In columns (4) and 
(5), we present IV estimates for the two labour market outcomes using the interaction 
between 1949 and middle-class family background as an instrumental variable. The 
results are remarkably similar to those using the first identification strategy. Indeed, 
they are not statistically different. In this approach, an additional year of education 
raises wages by 17 percentage points and the probability of holding an upper-level 
white-collar position (cadre) by 10 percentage points. 
Our estimates of the return to an additional year of education are higher than 
in most studies which use reforms to compulsory schooling as the source of 
identification.21  This suggests that the return to an additional year of higher education 
                                                 
21
 However, Harmon and Walker (1995), estimate a return of 15% in their IV approach – although this 
differs considerably from the OLS estimate of 6%.  
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may have a larger effect on an individual’s earning capacity than one additional year 
of compulsory schooling.22 
 
Table 5 : The effect of years of higher education on wages and the probability of 
holding an upper level managerial position (cadre). 
 First stage Reduced form  IV IV 
 Years of 
higher 
education 
Log wage Upper-level 
white-collar 
occupation  
 Log wage Upper-level 
white-collar 
occupation  
   cadre   cadre 
Years of higher 
education 
- - -  .17 
(.07) 
.10 
(.05) 
Cohorts       
Middle*1949 .34 
(.12) 
.060 
(.024) 
.034 
(.020) 
 -- -- 
1949 .12 
(.06) 
.045 
(.013) 
-.005    
(.010) 
 .02 
(.02) 
-.017 
(.013 
Middle*1952 .27 
(.12) 
.004 
(.025) 
.007 
(.020) 
 -.04 
(.02) 
-.019 
(.015 
1952 .04     
(.07) 
.074 
(.015) 
-.025    
(.012) 
 .07 
(.02) 
-.029 
(.010 
Age .013    
(.006) 
.024 
(.001) 
.004     
(.001) 
 .022 
(.002) 
.003 
.001 
Social background       
High (upper level) 3.42 
(.13) 
.53 
(.03) 
.46 
(.02) 
 -.07 
(.26) 
.12 
(.17 
High (lower level) 1.68 
(.12) 
.35 
(.03) 
.21 
(.02) 
 .06 
(.13) 
.04 
(.09 
Middle (upper) .72 
(.15) 
.22 
(.03) 
.11 
(.02) 
 .09 
(.07) 
.04 
(.05) 
Middle (lower) .36 
(.14) 
.19 
(.03) 
.05 
.02 
 .12 
(.05) 
.01 
(.03) 
Farmer -.03 
(.12) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.04    
(.02) 
 .04 
(.03 
-.03 
(.02) 
Manual worker -.31 
(.11) 
.05 
(.02) 
-.05    
(.02) 
 .10 
(.03 
-.02 
(.02 
N 11171 11171 11171  11171 11171 
Source: LFS, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. 
Sample: Male wage earners born in 1946, 1949 or 1952. 
Note: the excluded category for socio-economic background is ‘unknown’ 
 
The fact that our estimates do not differ radically across specifications gives us 
some confidence that estimates are robust and credible.  The cohorts affected by 1968 
did indeed benefit from the events of that year. As with other papers in this literature, 
we cannot say whether employers are rewarding the human capital gains from 
additional years of higher education or the signalling value of these years (and the 
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 This might be due either to the signalling or human capital value of an extra year of higher education 
vis-à-vis an extra year of compulsory schooling.  
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educational credential). However, we can say that enabling the ‘marginal’ university 
entrant to gain years of higher education led to high private gains at this time – as 
reflected in their wages and occupational standing. On this basis, one might 
hypothesise that a similar group could be affected in this way by policies designed to 
widen access to higher education (to the extent that this involves some lowering of 
thresholds and hence making the system less selective). The next question is whether 
this gain in education and earnings for the affected cohorts had any impact on the 
outcomes of their children. 
 
4. Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital 
 
 
An important policy issue is whether providing additional education to parents (and 
resources more generally) transmits to the next generation, thus breaking the cycle of 
intergenerational immobility that occurs in many countries (e.g. see for example, 
Solon, 2002; Blanden et al. 2002). An important problem is the difficulty in 
distinguishing causal effects of parental education on the outcomes of children from a 
correlation which arises from unobserved factors that transmit across generations (e.g 
environmental or genetic factors). There have been a few recent papers which 
consider an exogenous policy change to the education system in an attempt to identify 
the causal impact of parental years of education on children’s outcomes (Black et al, 
2003; Chevalier, 2004; and Oreopoulos et al., 2003). All these studies use an 
extension to compulsory schooling as the basis for identification. Black et al. (2003) 
do not find evidence of strong causal effects23 but suggest that a policy which 
increased enrolment in higher education might be transmitted more successfully. We 
                                                 
23
 However, in a UK context, Chevalier (2004) finds evidence for a causal effect of maternal education, 
though not for paternal education. Oreopoulous et al. (2003) find strong positive effects for both 
parents, which double when instrumented.  
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have an opportunity to consider this issue using the fact that the 1968 events provided 
an exogenous increase in the average years of higher education for the affected 
cohorts. Given the findings of the previous section (and the fact that the causal effect 
of education may arise through higher resources), we also show the effects of a high 
status occupation (i.e. cadre) on the educational outcomes of children. 
 Similarly to Oreopoulos et al. (2003), the outcomes we consider are measures 
of grade repetition. Grade repetition is a widespread phenomenon in many countries 
and is correlated with other measures of educational achievement. The Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the OECD shows that 15 year-
old French adolescents who have repeated a grade are likely to obtain much lower 
scores in maths, reading or science than those who progress to this point without 
grade repetition. In terms of standard deviations, the difference is equivalent to about 
1.14, 1.26 and 1.17 in maths, reading and science respectively (Murat and Rocher, 
2003). In the French context, this outcome can be considered as an appropriate 
measure of school performance. 
 We consider the sample of 15 year-old adolescents who are observed in the 
Labour Force Surveys between 1990 and 2001. We have information on their date of 
birth, education and occupation of their father. Comparing their age and actual grade, 
we know whether or not they are ‘normal’ age at school (i.e. in the 9th grade). For 
those who are not, we know whether they have been held back one or two grades (7th 
or 8th) or whether they are one grade ahead (10th grade).  
  A simple model of the relationship between parental and child outcomes can 
be described as follows: 
iii
p
iii ugccfs ++++= ⇓δ.α       (4.1) 
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where the school performance of child i (denoted si) is potentially affected by his/her 
parental resources (or education in particular) fi, the birth cohort of his father pic , 
his/her gender gi and birth cohort, ci. Holding the birth cohort of the child constant, 
the birth cohort of the parent may be correlated with outcomes because those who 
have children at a later stage may have a greater capacity to invest in the human 
capital of their children. The cohort trend captures a possible linear trend in school 
performance.  
As described in section 3.2, parental resources vary in a non-linear way across 
cohorts on account of the 1968 events:  
i
p
i
p
i
p
i
p
i
p
i
p
ii vcCdCdCdCdCdf ++++++= .51515050494948484747   (4.2) 
where the Cp
 
variables represent cohort dummies and vi is a random variable which 
represents the influence of unobserved factors. The d coefficients reflect the impact of 
the 1968 events on parental resources. In our empirical strategy, we first substitute 
equation (4.2) into (4.1) to estimate the reduced form. If α  is positive, we expect the 
dummy variables for the 1948 and 1949 cohorts to have significant positive effects on 
children’s outcomes. Secondly, we implement an IV approach where parental 
resources in (4.1) are instrumented by cohort dummies, measuring whether the father 
was born in 1948 or 1949 respectively. In this case, our sample is restricted to those 
born in an affected year (1948 or 1949) and the two ‘control’ years (1946 and 1952). 
 Table 6 shows the (first stage) equation (4.2) where the measures of parental 
resources are the father’s years of higher education (column 1) and whether the father 
is in an upper-level white-collar occupation, “cadre” (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, 
we estimate the reduced form version of equation (4.1), where the cohort of the father 
is used to explain children’s performance at school. Our primary measure of school 
performance corresponds to the difference between the actual grade of the adolescent 
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and the normal grade for his/her age group (i.e. the 9th grade). This takes a value of 1 
when the adolescent is one year ahead; 0 when he/she is of ‘normal’ age; -1 when 
he/she is one year behind; and –2 when he/she is two years behind. We describe this 
variable as ‘educational advancement at age 15’. We also present results when using a 
dummy variable to indicate whether the 15 year-old has been held back for at least 
two grades at school.24 
 
Table 6: The relationship between father’s cohort of birth, his resources and 
child performance at school 
  
Father’s resources 
  
Children’s performance 
 
 Father’s years of 
higher education 
Father=upper 
level white collar 
‘cadre’ 
 (Actual grade-
normal grade) 
Being two grades 
behind 
Dummies for 
father’s cohort 
     
1947 .17 
(.10) 
.00 
(.02) 
 -.006 
(.030) 
-.006 
(.013) 
1948 .29 
(.09) 
.043 
(.014) 
 .097 
(.027) 
-.043 
(.011) 
1949 .22 
(.08) 
.022 
(.013) 
 .070 
(.025) 
-.031 
(.011) 
1950 .12 
(.08) 
.016 
(.013) 
 .034 
(.024) 
-.01 
(.01) 
1951 .09 
(.08) 
.010 
(.013) 
 .052 
(.025) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Father’s cohort 
trend  
-.06 
(.02) 
-.013 
(.002) 
 -.003 
(.005) 
.000 
(.002) 
Child’s date of 
birth 
.07 
(.01) 
.007 
(.001) 
 .026 
(.002) 
-.011 
(.001) 
Male .01 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
 -.17 
(.01) 
.056 
(.006) 
      
 Source: LFS, 1990-2001; Adolescents of age 15 
 
The results show a strong positive relationship between birth in an affected 
cohort and father’s resources – whether this is measured by his years of higher 
education or his occupational status. As before, the strongest effects are found for the 
cohorts born in 1948 or 1949. In columns 3 and 4, we show that this translates into 
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 The results are qualitatively similar when we use a dummy indicating that the child is one year ahead 
or a dummy indicating that he/she is at least one year behind.   
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better school performance for their children. The continuous measure of educational 
advancement (in column 3) suggests that children of the affected cohorts are more 
likely to be on target or ahead in terms of where they were in the school system at age 
15 in comparison with the two cohorts which have been unaffected by the 1968 events 
(1946 and 1952). The effects are strong for the two most affected cohorts, 1948 and 
1949.  In column 4, results show that children of fathers born in these years are less 
likely to repeat two grades by 4.3 percentage points and 3.1 percentage points 
respectively.25  Hence, it would appear that the benefits of the 1968 events were 
transmitted to the children of the affected students. 
In table 7, we report regressions (estimating equation 4.1) where cohort 
dummies denoting whether the father was born in 1948 or 1949 are used as 
instrumental variables for the father’s years of higher education. The dependent 
variable is educational advancement, as measured by the difference between the 
child’s actual grade at age 15 with the ‘normal’ grade for this age group. We report 
the results from two IV strategies, where birth in 1948 is used as the instrument in the 
first approach (column 4) and birth in 1949 is used in the second approach (column 
5).  The IV regressions consist of those cohorts born in 1946, 1952 and either 1948 or 
1949, depending on the instrument used. 
In column 1, we report results from the first stage regression, where the 
father’s years of higher education are regressed against birth cohort dummies, a trend 
for his own birth cohort and that of his child and the gender of his child. As before, 
there is a strong positive relationship between birth in a cohort affected by the 1968 
events (1948 and 1949) relative to birth in the comparison cohorts (1946 and 1952). 
In column 2, we show the reduced form regression where the child’s educational 
                                                 
25
 The average probability of being at least 2 grades behind at age 15 is about 11 per cent for the 
children of fathers from cohorts 1946-52.   
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advancement at age 15 is the dependent variable (similarly to table 6).  Then in 
column 3, we report the OLS regression, before showing regressions using the two IV 
strategies in columns 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
Table 7: An evaluation of the impact of father’s education on children’s performance 
at school.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First 
Stage 
Reduced 
-Form 
OLS IV 
(Z=1948) 
IV 
(Z=1949) 
 Father’s 
education 
Actual –norm. 
grade 
Actual –
norm. grade 
Actual –norm. 
grade 
Actual –norm. 
grade 
Father’s 
education 
- 
 
- .076 
(.004) 
.33 
(.12) 
.32 
(.15) 
Father’s 
cohort=1948 
.29 
(.09) 
.097 
(.027) 
- - - 
Father’s 
cohort=1949 
.22 
(.09) 
.071 
(.025) 
- - - 
Father’s 
cohort trend  
-.06 
(.02) 
-.004 
(.005) 
.004 
(.005) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
Child’s cohort  
Trend  
.004 
(.005) 
.030 
(.003) 
-.023 
(.003) 
.006 
(.012) 
-.001 
(.014) 
Gender of 
child: Male 
.004 
(.005) 
-.16 
(.02) 
-.16 
(.02) 
-.16 
(.03) 
-.20 
(.03) 
N 5,087 5,087 5,087 3,710 3,804 
      
Source: LFS 1990-2001 
Note: Regressions include all children whose fathers were born in 1946, 1948, 1949 and 1952 (first 
stage, reduced form and OLS regressions in columns 1 to 3); 1946, 1948 and 1952 (column 4); and 
1946, 1949 and 1952 (column 5). 
 
 
Hence the regression results suggest a strong causal relationship between 
fathers’ educational resources and the school performance of their children. Most 
interestingly, the evaluation of this effect is almost exactly the same whether we use 
1949 or 1948 as an instrumental variable.26 The IV estimates indicate that an 
additional year of higher education by the father leads to an increase of .30 standard 
deviations in the child’s educational advancement at age 15.  These estimates are 
significantly larger than that estimated using OLS, which indicates an increase of only 
.10 standard deviations. Results are qualitatively similar when we use other measures 
                                                 
26
 The results are similar when we use the two instruments together. We have also checked that results 
are robust to the inclusion of a set of dummies indicating the age of the father. 
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of educational advancement, such as the probability of being two years behind at 
school. Also, results are qualitatively similar to Oreopoulos et al. (2003) in that larger 
effects are estimated in the IV approach.27 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The famous short-lived ‘revolution’ of 1968 had consequences for those undertaking 
important examinations in that year. The protracted delays, modifications to exam 
procedures and deliberate intention that any exams taking place should be ‘light 
touch’, led to higher pass rates than would otherwise have been the case. While for 
some students, this would have made no difference or only modified the timing of 
their progression through the education system, there is a sizeable group for which 
these events made a real difference to the years of higher education obtained. This 
group consists of birth cohorts where many would have been in very selective stages 
of the higher education system at the time of the 1968 events and corresponds to 1948 
and 1949 in particular. The importance of 1968 for the latter cohort is mainly due to 
the effect of the 1968 events on the examination for the baccalauréat. We also show 
that the ‘marginal’ student is more likely to be from a middle-class family 
background, which may be explained by the fact that students from lower socio-
economic groups are much less likely to progress to this level of education and 
students from higher socio-economic groups are more likely to pass the examinations 
in any given year. The consequence of 1968 for the affected group was that it became 
easier to progress to a further stage of higher education, and thus obtain more years of 
higher education than would otherwise have been the case.  
                                                 
27
 However the quantitative results are not comparable due to different measures of the dependent 
variable and the measure of parental education. 
 32 
 The regression results show a very strong relationship between birth in an 
affected cohort (especially 1948 and 1949) and labour market returns, whether these 
are measured by wages or the probability of holding a high-status occupation. For 
fathers, these effects are transmitted to the next generation since children are shown to 
be much less likely to repeat a grade at school.  
 We use these exogenous cohort-specific shifts in years of higher education to 
implement an instrumental variable strategy in which we estimate the labour market 
return to years of higher education and analyse whether these additional years have 
any causal impact on the educational outcomes of the next generation. The regression 
results show large private returns to a year of higher education. The returns are similar 
for both outcome measures (earnings; probability of holding an upper-level white 
collar occupation) and for the OLS and IV approaches. The estimated return is higher 
than in most studies in this literature and suggest that there may be a larger return to 
an additional year of higher education than, for example, an additional year of 
compulsory schooling (around which, most ‘experimental’ studies in this literature are 
based). This large return is transmitted to the next generation. The ‘natural 
experiment’ of 1968 suggests a strong causal relationship between the education of 
fathers and that of their children.  
The treatment group in this study is of much policy interest since it consists of 
people on the margin of the education system, who would also have been affected by 
any deliberate attempt to widen access to higher education at this time. Such people 
are shown to benefit greatly from the reduction of selectivity in the university system. 
This is manifest in their labour market returns. Furthermore, the strong positive 
effects of higher education are transmitted to the next generation.  
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We contribute to two important debates in the economics of education: What 
is the causal impact of an additional year of higher education? What is the true 
relationship between the education of parents and that of their children? We show the 
importance of an additional year of higher education for those on the margins of the 
higher education system. Thus, our results are of contemporary relevance. We also 
show the success of the revolutionaries of 1968, in ways that they were unlikely to 
have foreseen.  
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Appendix A 
 
The survey Formation et Qualification Professionelle (FQP), conducted in 1985 by 
the French Statistical Office, contains information on age at entry into the higher 
education system as well as on the educational credentials of the respondents. It 
shows that about 8% of the male respondents born between 1946 and 1952 entered 
into the system of higher education at age 18 or younger and that about 91% of these 
‘normal age’ male entrants obtain at least a university diploma (see columns 3 and 4). 
The FQP survey conducted in 1977 provides very similar results. Another FQP survey 
has been conducted in 1993 on a smaller sample, but with additional (retrospective) 
information on the educational career of respondents. It shows that the median age of 
students in terminal was 19 and that at age 19, about 10% of a cohort was in terminal 
(see columns 1 and 2). The size of the sample is about 500 male respondents per 
cohort for FQP 1985 and about 500 respondents per cohort (male and female) for FQP 
1993. 
 
 
 
Cohort 
 
Median age of 
students in 
Terminal (year of 
taking exam for 
baccalauréat) 
 
Proportion in 
Terminal at age 19 
  
Proportion entering 
higher education 
system at age 18 or 
younger 
 
Proportion obtaining 
university diploma if 
entering at age 18 or 
younger 
 
 
1946 
 
19 
 
.080 
  
.062 
 
.945 
1947 19 .111  .063 .894 
1948 19 .054  .054 .972 
1949 19 .105  .076 .932 
1950 19 .112  .086 .863 
1951 19 .094  .116 .895 
1952 19 .120  .099 .918 
Total 19 .096  .081 .912 
 
Source: All respondents FQP 1993 (columns 1 and 2) and male respondents FQP 1985 (columns 3 and 
4) 
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Appendix B. 
 
The impact of social background on obtaining a school diploma 
 
Note:  
The below table shows results from logistic regressions. In column 1, the dependent 
variable is whether a person leaves school without any diploma; in column 2, it is 
leaving school with only the junior school-leaving diploma (conditional on leaving 
school with some diploma). In the first regression, we see that the probability of 
leaving school without a diploma decreases with respect to the occupational status of 
the father. The second regression shows that conditional on obtaining a diploma at 
some stage in school, the probability of leaving school with only a junior school 
diploma is at its highest for children from a middle-class family background.  
 
   
 No diploma  
(unconditional) 
Junior school leaving diploma 
only (conditional on some 
diploma) 
   
Father’s occupation   
High   -1,73 
(0,05) 
 
-0,08 
(0,08) 
Middle -0.84 
(0,04) 
 
+0,33 
(0,08) 
Manual -0,05 
(0,03) 
 
+0,03 
(0,08) 
Farmer  Ref. Ref. 
   
Birth Cohort trend -.034 
(.006) 
-.03 
(.01) 
   
No. observations 26,320 17,743 
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